

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 331 166

EA 022 928

AUTHOR Wirt, Frederick M.
TITLE Forgetting History: 19th Century Decentralization of Education and Police.
PUB DATE Apr 91
NOTE 37p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association (Chicago, IL, April 3-7, 1991).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints (Opinion/Position Papers, Essays, etc.) (120)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Decentralization; *Educational History; Elementary Secondary Education; Governance; Ideology; Law Enforcement; *Organizational Development; Police; *Policy Formation; *Politics of Education; Power Structure; *Public Service; Resource Allocation; School Restructuring; Social Control; Values

ABSTRACT

Although the current educational restructuring movement in the United States may be designed to improve schooling, it is also a political reform designed to shift the locus of authority over allocation of this service. This political theme is developed in the context of the historical shift from decentralized to centralized delivery of urban public services, including schooling, that was brought about by 19th century reforms. A discussion of the value basis of public policy concludes that value conflict is inherent in all democratic policy making and that value satisfaction requires distinctive forms of organization for proper implementation. A sketch of the value-organization linkage of the period up to 1900 of two contrasting urban services--police and education--illustrates how policy services manage two basic organizational problems: the interface of delivery of services and control. The historical analysis concludes that the provision of either service moved from the private and fragmented to the public and decentralized, and finally, to an integrated, professionalized, and centralized organizational structure. A conclusion is that reform success came at the expense of the formerly decentralized system and created public acceptance of the myth of being apolitical. An implication is that the current school-based management trend will be affected by the organization itself, not without some negative consequences. One table is included. (46 references) (LMI)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

FORGETTING HISTORY: 19TH CENTURY
DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION AND POLICE

Frederick M. Wirt
Department of Political Science
University of Illinois-Urbana

ED331166

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Paper prepared for delivery at the 1991 convention of the American
Education Research Association, Division F, Chicago, Illinois.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION
CENTER (ERIC)

☒ This document has been reproduced as
received from the person or organization
originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve
reproduction quality.

• Points of view or opinions stated in this docu-
ment do not necessarily represent official
OERI position or policy.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

F. Wirt

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

FORGETTING HISTORY: 19TH CENTURY DECENTRALIZATION OF EDUCATION AND POLICE

"...the apparently ineradicable belief of the American people that in the right mechanical arrangement of a municipal department, if only it can be discovered, lies the solution of the ills that trouble us" (Fosdick, 1920, 113).

The current drive for restructuring educational decision making may be designed to improve schooling, but it is also a political reform designed to shift the locus of authority over allocation of this service. This paper develops this political theme in the context of the historical shift of decentralized urban public services, including schooling, to reforms during the 19th century that centralized all urban public services.

That theme points to a conflict among a few basic values that are inherent in all democratic policy making. That concept will be developed before illustrating it from the histories of two public services, police and schooling. The treatment is brief, as it is a first statement of a theme to be developed more fully at a later time.

The Value Basis of Public Policy

We begin with the theme of the political conflict that drives policy making in democratic systems. That theme consists of four sub-themes. Policy making is primarily the allocation of governmental resources; that allocation is distributed differently among citizens; it rests upon certain values that it is designed to promote; and a few basic values are involved.

Policy as Allocation

Underlying the cut-and-thrust of policy making is a contest over who will receive the services and subsidies, or be restricted by the regulations, that are core functions of all governments. Essentially, the process is one of allocating these desired or feared actions among citizens who are affected by them. These essentials of policy making are made manifest in a set of three generic public policies found in all communities (Peterson, 1981).

These include "developmental" policies designed to stimulate the local economy by subsidizing a few businessmen in order to bring large returns in the form of more jobs, revenues, and public services. Another set of policies is "distributive," that is, those allocating public revenue among a community's core of housekeeping services, like safety, transportation, or health; all these benefit everyone by means of subsidy or regulation. Yet another set of policies is "redistributive," those using taxes from one group of citizens to benefit another group, often in the form of welfare benefits for the poor. From this perspective, education shares qualities of all three policy types. Taxes from the more affluent pay for education of the less affluent (i.e., redistributive), everyone has access to schooling (i.e., distributive), and a well-schooled work force attracts new business (i.e., developmental). As governmental resources are invariably in short supply, the effort to allocate them creates conflict over who gets what, when, and how.

The Distribution of Public Services

A second sub-theme arises from the fact that not everyone receives the same quantity or quality of every public service, subsidy, or regulation. Rather, within any community there are two primary patterns for distribution of such services--even or uneven. The even pattern arises when government resources are either distributed to all (and are used equally by all) or are available equally to all when sought. Illustrative are public roads, or lawyers provided for indigent defendants, and public schooling. These services are often characterized as "free public goods" which all need and secure to some degree. On the other hand, the uneven pattern occurs when governmental resources are distributed to some citizens but not others; the mal-distribution may be explained variously. Class, political, or rational goals drive this distribution. The class explanation posits hierarchical power as explaining governmental action, the political explanation the negotiation and coalition inherent in urban service decisions, and the rational explanation the bureaucratic and professional determination of citizens' needs.

The actual distribution of urban services among neighborhoods of differing status in big cities provides evidence of both types. Typically, in San Antonio during the 1970's, there was found an "unpatterned inequality" in these distributions for which class explained service provisions very poorly (Lineberry, 1977). In other

communities, different ways of measuring these services produced different results. But "the cumulative weight of the evidence seems clear [because such] studies are more likely than not to find either roughly equal or even compensatory patterns than to find discriminatory patterns" (186; see literature reviewed at 185).

The Value Basis of Public Policy

A third sub-theme is that policy, proceeding from the interaction of policy makers and citizen clientele, is not, and cannot be, value-neutral. The crux of the David Easton's classical definition of the political system as "the authoritative allocation of values and resources" emphasizes the primacy of values in driving the search for public resources (Easton, 1965).

The value basis of policy may overt and evident to those who clash over these allocations. A dramatic example is school desegregation, which clearly intended to redistribute educational resources in order to improve the schooling of minority children. But the value basis may also be implied from analysis of policy events by observers. One major example is seen in the implicitly political nature of professional decision making in education, including decisions about curriculum, despite professionals insisting on their apolitical role (Wirt and Kirst, 1989; Schaffarzick and Sykes., 1979).

The Limited Set of Values in Policy Conflict

The last sub-theme focuses on values themselves. Amid the conflict attending policy disputes it is difficult to realize that, despite a multitude of voices, the fight is over just a few taproot values. Garms, Guthrie, and Pierce (1987) have helped us understand that only three are involved--quality, efficiency, and equity--to which we add a fourth--choice. Elaboration of these values' definitions and justifications are found more fully elsewhere (Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt, 1989, chaps. 4,6); Wirt, 1991). A briefer definition is provided here as the basis of understanding the historical conflict over police and education that we treat later in this paper.

Quality is the "best" by some standard of whatever service, subsidy, or regulation is sought in policy. Underlying this value is

another and more general one, that is, the importance of enhancing the quality of life of a community's citizens. This value appears most often in the standards for performing services or using public resources to achieve the the quality of life conditions those standards seek

This value in education policy is most familiar as the standards that permeate all schooling in this and other nations. For example, these standards judge the nature of curriculum, the level of student achievement, and the control of staff. This value also is manifest in similar standard-setting and implementation in other policy areas, for example, the merit system and quality control that operate for police and fire forces, roads and libraries, and almost any urban public service today.

Efficiency as a value refers to efforts to increase organizational productivity and to ensure responsibilities of subordinates to superiors in exercising public authority. Both forms of efficiency are alike in 1) ensuring accountability, either to the citizens politically or to a hierarchy bureaucratically, and 2) effectiveness in the use of public resources. A more basic value underlies efficiency, namely, the importance of effective and responsible use of power in all political systems.

Efficiency is manifest in public policy in two forms. In the effectiveness form, a cost-benefit standard is often used to measure the effectiveness of using governmental resources. In education it is seen in the familiar teacher-pupil ratio designed to measure teaching effectiveness. In the responsibility form of efficiency, numerous processes of decision making and information flows are instituted within organizations that are designed to monitor how honestly and effectively power is being employed. A familiar example in education policy are the detailed specifications for devising and authorizing school district budgets. These activities inform citizens of costs and programs in this service, which is important in making the citizen role effective; they also inform superior authorities whether appropriate procedures are being observed.

Equity refers to value judgments about the proper distribution of governmental resources among citizens to ensure some standard of fairness. Again, standard-setting permits judgements about how well they are met. This value is manifest in the frequent claims of

one group that its needs are not being well met compared to other groups, leading to the demand that this mal-distribution be remedied. Equity reflects an even deeper value, that of fairness in the use of political power over human needs. A concern for equity has permeated the development of political power in democracies, seen best in the ever-widening expansion of the franchise. At the level of urban policy, equity is manifest in complaints against insufficient services and in subsequent efforts to secure more. In education policy, the value of equity is manifest in the search for desegregation or for more resources for vocational, bi-lingual, and handicapped or gifted education.

Choice is an intensely political value that drives the search for alternatives to selecting officials or in providing policy services, alternatives from which citizens may select their own preferences. This is a value that distinctively separates the democratic from the authoritarian political systems, because choice reflects another value that lies at the heart of democracies. That value is popular sovereignty, the ultimate authority in democracy for the use of governmental power which lies with citizens. While most often thought of in relation to elections to public office, choice appears also in the use of referenda and in the options for citizens to select from a range of services, subsidies, or regulations. In education policy, the value of choice is seen in tax or bond referenda, school board or superintendent elections, curricular options for students, and parental advisory councils. Indeed, the current debate over choice in selection of schools or in site-based management pivot on this value (Boyd and Kerchner, 1989).

Even these brief descriptions of the meaning and examples of the four values lead to an understanding of the policy-making arena as one in which four bases for making decisions exist. However, these four values are not mutually compatible (for expanded interpretation, see, Marshall, Mitchell, and Wirt, 1989). Because it maximizes options, the value of Choice conflicts with Quality, which minimizes options to only the best one. Choice also works against Efficiency, another case of the many policy preferences that conflict with the one that is most effective or responsible. Finally, Choice must conflict with Equity because the selection by citizens from among many options will usually lead to an uneven distribution of results, while critics seek a uniform distribution of those resources. However, Quality is compatible with Efficiency because the second value involves seeking an effective and responsible

implementation of goals of the first value. Quality is also compatible with Equity, whose supporters seek the benefits of additional governmental resources to improve their quality of life.

Summary

The opening section of this paper has suggested a set of propositions about the value basis of policy making. In the distribution of governmental resources through policy making, the results may be even or uneven, and one explanation may lie in the values that drive particular policies. As values will differ, however, their proponents must seek policy services for the protection or enhancement of their own values. That condition makes policy arenas a search for the satisfaction of often clashing values. Four basic values, each reflecting yet other values, are distinguishable as quality, efficiency, equity, and choice. But how can proponents of these values organize to maximize their benefits from public services?

The Value-Organization Linkage

The second major proposition in this analysis is that value satisfaction in public policy requires distinctive forms of organization for proper implementation. More fully developed in another paper at this convention (Wirt, 1991), the idea is that just as value and resources are inextricably linked to policy, so, too, is the form of organizing these governmental resources.

Organizational Assumptions

The basic assumptions here are two-fold. First, organizations have great utility in social and political life. They concentrate human resources, generate and focus the specialization of labor that is a hallmark of the modern era, permit the socialization of personnel through reward systems, and--in short--enable a mobilization of human energies in order to meet significant goals in society. A second assumption is not as obvious but is closely linked to it. This is that no organization is value-free, because the way that it is shaped reflects the values of those who created it. Schattschneider (1960, 71) has coined the key phrase that an organization constitutes a "mobilization of bias," that is, the goals of those who form an organization drive its particular mobilization

of human energies , as noted. If "bias" is understood as preference for a particular valued goal, then we can analyze organizations as being linked inextricably to goals, both manifest and latent.

Note further that a crucial element of any organization is the location within it of the authority to pursue its goals. That authority may exist at the top or at the bottom of the system, and either location is linked to different values. For example, the prevalent form of organizations in the modern world locates authority at the top. This location incorporates hierarchies of job specialities, intricate channels of communication, overlapping control mechanisms, and inter-organizational ties. This form can be conceived as maximizing one set of values while blocking yet another set that is better served by a bottom-up form. This concept is explored more fully later in the historical evidence of police and schooling services, so we need to explain it more fully first.

Organizations and Core Values

We suggest that the top-down organization mobilizes a bias for the core values of quality, efficiency, and equity. Each of these embodies a set of standards by which to judge the distribution of policies in the political world. Recall that quality focuses on standards of enhanced life conditions, efficiency on those of effectiveness and accountability, and equity on those of fairness among the citizens served by policy. Consequently, each of these values and its standards can only be maximized when organizational authority is concentrated at the top. That condition integrates areal and functional activities, permits a sharing of information on the policy environment, devises and applies a set of rewards and penalties to motivate personnel, and coordinates other organizational tasks that maximize value satisfaction. All these operations are possible only with a centralized authority.

On the other hand, the value of choice is not served well by such organization. The proponents of this value need an organization that will mobilize their bias quite differently as Shalala has pointed out (1972). They argue that centralization works against diversifying options for using public resources, it assumes a sameness in human needs, it codifies life experiences into a limited set, and it insists that only those skilled in their specialities can decide and administer public policy.

Alternatively, it is argued, decentralized organizations, that is systems of devolved decisional authority, can mobilize energies in a way that facilitates the differing needs served by the choice value. They urge that decisions about public resources be made so that small, local, and differing groups of citizens are directly involved, not as consultants but as deciders. This decentralized form maximizes satisfying the diversity of policy needs. But it is exactly this form that works against the goals of quality, efficiency, and equity noted above. These criticism and reforms of today's organization for schooling are heard in the choice and site-based management advocates (e.g., Chubb and Moe, 1990; Seeley, 1985).

In short, centralization fosters the focusing of human energies on singular standards set and run by specialized persons, often specialized professionals. But decentralization disperses would disperse these energies to match other definitions of public needs that citizens feel.

The Linkage Proposition and the Historical Shift

Consequently, there is a value-organization linkage that underlies much policy conflict, even though the the manifest signs of it seem to be about different programs for distributing public resources. The argument here is that who says one set of values with its programs must also say a distinctive organization for realizing them. The contradictions of these values noted earlier is not merely a conceptual statement. Our history of urban policy reflects a marked shift from one of these linkages to another, as we will shortly see.

That history reveals distinctive, recognizable eras in public policy and its organization (Griffith, 1974; Griffith and Adrian, 1976). From the colonial to the Civil War periods, we began with an urban condition of fragmented policy making with a very limited scope of services. After that war, cities moved to an increasing centralization and proliferation of, and unified control, over urban programs. After the turn of the century and during the Progressive reforms, the latter conditions became highly centralized and professionalized, at different rates across urban America. Then, beginning over fifty years ago--and accelerated in the last quarter-century--control and policy increasingly came from the state, and finally, federal levels (Wright, 1988). Through this history, the

shift has been from bottom-up, fragmented organization in providing limited quality and equitable services, to one that was top-down and focused control of higher quality and more equitable services. In this process, the "top" moved to ever-higher levels of American governments in escalator fashion (Shields, 1952), while complaints increased about the costs of this system.

But note that for the first two hundred or more years of our existence, the decentralized value-organizational linkage was pervasive among urban cities ("towns" is a more apt label, given our small urban population). The reasons can only be briefly described here, because they had to be overcome when subsequent centralization was undertaken (for further explanation, see Elazar, 1984; Wright, 1988).

The reasons for decentralization being the norm are several. First, the colonies and early Republic eras emphasized strongly three desirable conditions. These were the dominant role of the state in the web of American governments, the need for only a few public policies and, within the state, local control over them. These conditions and their policy attitudes were quite consonant with the prevailing ideology about the individual's responsibility and the local community's coping with its own problems. A second reason for decentralization was the rise of political parties after 1800, which came to structuring policy decisions. These organizations by the Jacksonian era came under local control. Nationally and within each state, parties became confederations of loosely linked sub-systems; that organization blocked any nationalization of authority because it responded only to local-control attitudes. Finally, the third factor stressing decentralization was the absence of any bureaucracy that was competent or numerous enough to create and administer a unified policy system--even had the public wanted more local services.

As a result of these decentralized conditions, there existed for a long time a mosaic of values across America on what government should do. The result was a diverse set of regional "political cultures" whose effects are evident even today (Elazar, 1985, chap. 5). The history of this long period demonstrates the popular belief of those Americans that value diversity was best satisfied by a governmental diversity that could reflect differing public services--or none at all.

But this orientation was to yield over time due to social changes and new ideas about the uses of political power. The arrival of unbelievable numbers of immigrants before and after the Civil War, most of whom settled in the large cities, created great demand for more urban services. Also, the rise of a middle class with new notions about the honest and efficient administration of those services created other pressures on the local policy systems. Later, the inability of local governments to meet the demands of major economic crises escalated the provision of policy services to state and federal levels, a response to new values. All of these earlier conditions, so compatible with a decentralized and inactive organization of policy making, yielded to new conditions and created a new organization.

Scope and Method

Next, this value-organization linkage will be sketched, limiting the analysis only to the period up to about 1900 and to just two contrasting urban services--police and education. In these two policies, the clients of these services are drastically different--the roughest versus the most naive elements of society. Each service knows contrasting public attitudes, attracts different personalities, and requires differing training. These differences--and others exist--provide us with a conservative method of testing our propositions. Given these differences in the services, we should expect to find different values and organizations manifest in this history. If not, though, then the proposition of value-organization linkage would have some validity. Later eras and other public services will be analyzed in later writing, but this paper is an introduction to that analysis.

All policy services must deal with two basic organizational problems. How to organize the delivery of services at the interface of the organization and its clientele? And, how to control this delivery at the top of the organization? The interface problem will be shown to have a similar pattern in both police and education. Providing either service moves from the private and fragmented to the public and decentralized, and finally to an integrated, professionalized, and centralized. The control problem will show a similar pattern, from individualized and private control by some citizens to decentralized control by urban subdivisions to city-wide control and, finally, in some cases, to a highly centralized state

control. At each stage, the values that dominated these organizational shifts will be examined in light of the services provided.

The Organization of Police Protection

Looking over the sweep of American history, the leading scholar on police administration has noted central qualities of its development and its control:

So it has come about that our police systems have 'grown up with the country' [so that they have] not really enjoyed an opportunity for orderly and consistent development. [T]he general public does not want law enforcement in the strict sense of the term, [and so police forces] have been deliberately weakened in response to popular demand. [These are] the best of reasons for our high crime rate and for the unsatisfactory functioning of our agencies of public justice. [Further, corruption] afflicts all police forces--even the best of them--in some degree, and in a few instances has dominated police establishments for generations (Smith, 1949, 1, 5,13).

In the terms of our paper, this search for the values of quality and efficiency, even equity, has been blocked by the dominating influence of choice, with its attendant favoritism and ignoring of the law.

While the need for protection against threats to life and property are universal, the form of police protection now universal was unknown before the early 1800's in England and the United States. Citing these two is relevant, because we inherited British practices in the colonial period and later adopted some other British reforms. Over time, though, a growing urban population brought demands for more services--the interface problem--while Americans experimented with different controls of those services.

The Colonial Period to 1800

The colonial era inherited five offices for controlling crimes: justice of the peace, sheriff, the *posse comitatus*, coroner, and constable (Griffith, 1927; Chapman and St. Johnston, 1962). By all accounts they were quite inefficient. Indeed, most criminals were not caught by these officers but rather by members of families, church, or neighborhood; mostly, it was citizens snitching on other citizens, the ultimate in a decentralized service to the community.

The colonials' private informers became in time paid informers in general, then specialized informers to enforce particular laws, who in time united to form a corps of marshals or general enforcers, a loose organization that was still highly decentralized before the Revolution (Bacon, 1939, 9). As early as 1636, Boston had supplemented its constable with a night watch of citizens required to take turns at the job. It was a much resented practice that provided no protection at all during the day and was ridiculed by the community (to top off an evening, carousers would overturn the box in which the watchman sat) (Fosdick, 1920, chap. 2). Obviously not trained or interested, these watchmen were instructed to "walk their rounds slowly and silently and now and then stand still and listen" (20).

However, new problems appeared throughout the eighteenth century for which this type of protection became increasingly inefficient in the towns, and these problems grew with population into the nineteenth century. These included:

1. Class, religious, and racial conflict.
2. Consumer mistreatment in marketing and making food.
3. Maintaining health and sanitation.
4. Ubiquitous fires.
5. Traffic congestion.
6. Maintaining public order in public places.
7. Control of drunkenness, gambling, vice, weapons.
8. Guarding against animals and pests (Bacon, 1939, 8).

The diverse needs in this list would later spin off new kinds of service organizations in the form of departments for fire protection, health, sanitation, roads, and economic development.

But even before the Revolution it was clear that a new organization of protection was needed. There appeared a system of police (a word not used before 1800), organized by wards or districts. These men were characteristically selected by political ("jaded stevedores, teamsters, and mechanics," said one critic), prone to great turnover, and providing protection only at night (in New York, ward captains would define dawn to dusk quite differently) (Fosdick, 1920, 61-62). This was a decentralized organization evidencing little interest in city-wide standards of quality or efficiency, and none in equity. But it did provide different neighborhoods with their own distinctive brand of protection--a manifestation of the value of choice.

Given this organization's problems, changes occurred so that by 1830 no citizen police existed. Rather, special officers emerged as full-time specialists, such as a "detective" force for catching criminals 24 hours a day. This loose collection of specialists would merge into the politicized police force after the Civil War. After that, though, a later professionalization would create the police of the last two generations. Organizationally, over the last century the police would take on modern criteria, including:

- (a) city-wide jurisdiction, (b) 24-hour responsibility, (c) a single organization in charge of the greater part of formal enforcement, (d) a paid personnel on a salary basis, (e) a personnel occupied solely with police duties, (f) general rather than specific functions (Bacon, 1939, 6).

What occurred before 1800 in five cities--New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Charleston, and New Orleans--has been closely studied by Bacon (1939). He found that expansion of services and more formal control of the police became a necessity, due not to just growing population, but rather to three other factors.

Functional specialization in the growing urban society emerged increasingly. That was particularly true in the production and distribution of goods and services, that called forth a similar specialization and efficiency in police protection. For example, the collecting of firewood was done in the colonial era by private individuals, but as the supply receded with growing population specialists emerged to cut and sell it; in turn, their fraudulent

practices led to ordinances curtailing them and authorizing city police to supervise them. This pattern of malpractice followed by regulation became extensive, as Table 1 shows for New York early in the 19th century.

(Table 1 about here)

This list is an extraordinary range of misdemeanors, and unsuspected evidence that our forefathers took a stout hand in the local economy.

A second factor contributing to change in policy services and control lies in the increasing *group stratification*. Differences in religion, race, ethnicity, language, welfare, and education were not simply a potential for clash but a reality, as the number of riots demonstrates. Between 1800 and 1866, 37 riots took place over race, Catholicism, elections, taverns, brothels, and the Civil War draft (Griffith and Adrian, 1976, 227-28). Philadelphia had the most (11), including three successive years in the 1840's.

Underlying these riots was a characteristic pattern. Powerful leaders of the dominant urban group would devise "acceptable modes of behavior and then placed agents at those places and in those times where conflict is likely to arise" and thereby check deviance (768-69). Examples abound of using the police to enforce the dominant norms (771-73). Picking up sticks on a Sunday was forbidden by law in Cotton Mather's Boston of 1761 (20 wardens enforced it), but two decades later Samuel Adams, new champion of the people, overturned it. In Philadelphia clashes between Yankee oldtimers and Roman Catholic immigrants precipitated frequent bloody riots (as noted) when the latter resisted these regulations of their behavior. The same conflict appeared in New Orleans between the Yankees and the Creoles. Of course, whites everywhere constrained blacks, even the "free" or "mulattoes, to codes of behavior that the police oversaw.

Finally, increasing *population density* affected the quality of life. With crowding came new ordinances to protect that quality, and the police were to enforce them. Use of streets was most visible evidence of the proposition (Bacon, 1939, 777-79). Streets can be used for many purposes when density is low that are inefficient or depress life quality when it becomes high. For example, dumping garbage or transporting explosives become

unacceptable, and so ordinances appeared to compel street paving or gutters or restrict traffic (e.g., the right of way).

From the colonial era onwards, then, the private and individual effort to deal with town problems weakened in the face of these factors of specialization, group conflict, and density. Police forces came into being to deal with the effects of these changes, first as specialized enforcers (see Table 1), but only in the early nineteenth century did general enforcers emerge whom we would recognize as an early version of the "police." From 1800 on, then, there was an effort to seek quality results by more efficient methods in distributing services and in controlling police authority. These values were pursued through a highly decentralized set of service providers operating within a fragmented police authority.

1800 to the Civil War

To deal with these problems of policing, in the second quarter of the 1800's, "American cities literally ran riot in their experimental devices. There followed a hurried effort [in the last quarter-century] to consolidate the forces which had been organized by wars or other minor areas" (Smith, 1949, 105). After 1800, the city was changing its nature, and social change can be quite violent, as noted above.

Not surprisingly, by the 1830's there was talk of reform in all the big cities (Griffith and Adrian, 1976, 65). Some made tentative first steps (Fosdick, 1920, 64), for example, Boston started daytime police in 1838, but even then, there were still day and night supervisors who rarely communicated. Philadelphia in 1833 adopted the first merit system for police appointments and promotions, under a mayor and with a centralized administration under one officer, using the new term, "chief." That ordinance was repealed later, though, a pattern that was repeated in New York, where state legislation required this new organization, until a new partisan control of the legislature overturned it.

The central issue was patronage. Even when the generalized police developed out of the specialized police, jobs were patronage-based. Typically, an 1844 state law put all New York city's police jobs under patronage, with only a one-year tenure and selection by the aldermen. In effect, the consolidation meant that service and control were still decentralized to the ward, for the police chief had

neither authority nor influence to apply city-wide regulations to his men in the wards. A New York district attorney in 1857 concluded that "There is really no head of police at all, but each captain is a head in his own district, and discipline varies in different wards according to the attention or skill and tact" (cited in Fosdick, 1920, 68). Typically, policemen everywhere rejected the notion of wearing a uniform or the same one, call it "undemocratic" and "militaristic." Worse, though, was police lawlessness.

As tools of the dominant party, officers could suppress political opposition, often cruelly. Or use their authority to ignore laws, for example, "assaulting superior officers, refusing to go on patrol, releasing prisoners from the custody of other policemen, drunkenness, extorting money from prisoners" (69). All these acts were possible when officers' responsibility was not to laws or a profession but to favors granted by a ward boss. The practice was the fruit of Jacksonianism, of course, which wanted all offices to be elected or under control of the elected, with any personnel turnover linked to electoral reversals.

A first effort at reform of such conditions was made in the 1850's with a more efficient control at the top, namely, an independent board or commission, similar to those existing for education and poor relief and used in England (77). Philadelphia in 1850 and New York in 1853 created boards to hire and fire police and provide general administration. Other cities followed, varying the board's size, method of selection, partisanship, and power. Control became even more centralized with state legislative intervention. Such a law in 1857 (modelled after London's) consolidated the police forces of cities and counties in and around New York city; a board was also appointed by the governor with three-year terms and with jurisdiction over this consolidation. But the hand of party was stronger than that of reform, even though it took thirteen years to remove this state control. New Yorkers seethed all that time at outside interference (and English to boot!). But this state's influence spread to other states in this form of police control; Boston was the last big city to adopt it. The concept was further expanded to other New York city policies such as parks, fire, health, with a state board for each. However, fuelled by party leaders, a reaction against this control of police finally overturned it in 1870 here and elsewhere, although it lasted well into this century in Maryland and Missouri.

Consequently, the pre-Civil War era saw the first new perspective on delivering and controlling police service that involved greater centralization. But the forces of decentralization, reflected in the machine, would still flourish after Appamattox.

The Party Machine Era

This post-1970 return to local party domination of urban services made patronage for police jobs the norm all across America. The evidence (96-102) was that state control had been just as partisan and patronage-driven as the local variety. Wherever authority was centralized in this century--ward, city, or state--favoritism prevailed, as standards of quality, efficiency, and equity were unknown or laughable. "It was not uncommon for a change in the party in power to be followed by the replacement of an entire force," for example Wilmington, Delaware (Griffith, 1974, 54, 89).

In effect, feudalism prevailed. As one historian has concluded:

Under the Tweed Ring, the police department became a patchwork of almost independent kingdoms, where the Captain was autocrat and ruled, it was said, by divine right. The Captain and his favorite subordinate often took exclusive control of cases, removing the task from the patrolmen; thus some cases would be dropped for political reasons (Callow, 1966).

The closest to a centralized control under the machine was adoption in the 1880's of "bipartisan" boards to administer police services. But it was a failure because the appointees were ward leaders' favorites, regardless of which party they served; so logrolling between party leaders assured that their respective slates were always appointed. But this control was abandoned almost everywhere for police and other services because it was "[d]ivided in its counsels, *decentralized in its authority*, with no unity of policy or solidarity of action" (Fosdick, 1920, 107; emphasis added).

The Progressive Era of Urban Reform

However, two major changes were to overwhelm urban services after 1870. First, quality of life and equity in distribution of governmental resources improved greatly when more functions were added to city government. For example, in 1872, Brooklyn's charter had provided "police, excise, health, fire and buildings, city works, parks, public instruction. By 1898 such a list would have added: courts, prisons, charities, libraries, museums, play-grounds, baths, street cleaning and snow removal, garbage, markets, publicly owned utilities" (Griffith, 1974, 156). The second change in urban services was in its control. This came from reforms in control of public authority by gutting the power of parties, restructuring government into a more efficient and honest system, and democratizing the electoral process.

Both changes--more policies, more control--were to be the enduring gifts of the Progressive movement before and after 1900. An unprecedented union of secular, intellectual, and religious forces, this "Age of Reform" (Hofstadter, 1960), its proponents focused upon a "New Municipal Reform" (its principles set out in Woodruff, 1919; see bibliography in Patton, 1940). The movement was founded on this organization of private urban groups across the nation in at least 78 cities, mostly large, but also in smaller places like Dayton, Ohio, and Champaign and Decatur, Illinois (Tolman, 1895).

Its members saw about them a scene of urban decay. Said one, nicely capturing the pungency of the movement's language and the certainty of its moral perspective:

1870 was the low ebb of American city government....Immigration, the appearance of the corporation, the intense partisanship, the prevailing lawlessness, the inadequacy of the antiquated forms of city government, the spoils system--all were related to the degeneracy permitted by a people absorbed in national issues or indifferent through the moral reaction after the [Civil] War (cited in Griffith, 1927, 20-21).

To treat these ailments, the Progressive brought many principles of greater quality and efficiency in providing services and controlling authority. Cities adopted these principles under

pressure from the "municipal league" or "civic betterment" agency noted above, all with a common agenda (e.g., Woodruff, 1919). Urged in the late 1890's and adopted early in this century, these would be codified in the 1920's in political scientists' textbooks on the goal of efficiency and honesty (e.g., Munro, 1923; Wright, 1925); these books echo similar principles to be urged decades later in other such books (Reed, 1941).

These reforms also attacked the organization of the politicized police system, leading ultimately to the single-leadership principle, merit system, and other principles of the movement. As a result, by 1920, only 14 of 52 cities over 100,000 population still used police boards; the rest were run by single leaders, whether chief or commissioner, with or without council authority (Fosdick, 1920, 108). But unlike, England, further centralization to metropolitan or state levels, did not occur.

The centralized control and professionalization of police services, started in the reform era, lagged in practice then, and some believe now. Centralized control had begun in the engineering services, such as sewerage, paving, fire-fighting, and they spread in 1900 and later to education and its administration, as we will see. But in the police force, unlike a related service like fire-fighting, reform came

later than most functions in developing a literature....Public attention was directed towards its depolitization, albeit with indifferent success, and toward companion objectives of eliminating police graft, with even less success....[B]ut, of all the departments of city government, this lagged the most, and its chiefs probably had the greatest rate of turnover (Griffith, 1974, 273-75).

However, by 1900 the search by reformers for quality through professionalization and efficiency through centralization had been begun. By the 1920's, their principles in both values would later be codified in textbooks (e.g., Graper, 1921; see also Fosdick, 1920; Munro, 1923; Wright, 1925) with prescriptive chapters on personnel, training, and specialized services. These norms, with some changes, filled similar textbooks more recently (Smith, 1949), as the police had accepted, albeit grudgingly, any of these ideas.

Summary

This sketch of a vital but fragmented urban service and regulation has focused upon the dual problems of controlling the distribution of services and the use of authority that were set out at this section's opening. In this police history of half-hearted efforts at providing both effective service and control, only sketched here, we can see how the value of choice dominated the period from the colonial to the reform era. That value emphasized local control, which in the cities meant ward and neighborhood control, with all its attendant favoritism in jobs and its poor quality and efficiency in law enforcement. Whether it was the reluctant citizen serving a long, boring night as watchman or the ward-selected "coppers" of the machine era, choice meant limited standards of quality and inefficiency, while inequity is evident in the selective enforcement that favored one's neighbor or the ward boss's friends. These were inescapable results of a high decentralized system.

Outside influences, such as state laws embodying the Progressives' principles or increasing professionalism, had to intervene to break up this choice system. With the change to a centralized structure--in most cases headed up at the city level of government--new ideas about improved quality, efficiency, and equity of service provision could begin to work, no matter how tentatively at first. Blocking boss rule, and eventually gutting local political parties were other contributions of the Progressives that assured centralization and promoted its attendant values in urban services. But note that the change came at the cost of local control and its core value of choice. Thus values and organizations are linked to the questions of distributing and controlling these services.

The Reform of the Schooling Service

The history of American education is more familiar, but it, too, demonstrates the value conflict set out in the introduction, and continuing changes in organizations to provide the schooling service. The historical sequence of the 19th century was from private-fragmented to public-fragmented, and finally to the professional-centralized model of schooling. Underlying these organizational changes were a shifting focus on different values.

The Colonial Era

Colonial schooling was a mosaic of ideas and practices, all quite fragmented and decentralized. "The variety of colonial educational institutions and practices emerged hand in hand with the growth of an increasingly self-conscious and pluralistic American society" (Sloan, 1971, 299, a source used below, but see also Morison, 1956). Differences among the sections, classes, and religions in the colonies shaped this service. Over time, though, the mosaic became even more complex.

The Seventeenth Century. The colonialists had inherited a tradition that education was valuable for training leaders of social institutions in humanistic and traditional values. The earliest arrivals came just after a dramatic change in England, promoting education for all but the poorest, although institutions other than schools also educated, for example, church, family, and even apprenticeships. Not surprisingly, then, the first settlements in Massachusetts and Virginia provided for some schooling.

Massachusetts set the norm for much of New England. As early as 1642, its legislature had required families or apprentices' masters to teach reading in order for children to understand religion; local councils in each town were to oversee compliance. Five years later, the legislature ordered sets of families to band together to pay for a teacher or, if a large set, a school. Policy was determined by each town in a town meeting and overseen by local officials. Significantly, in this period local schools became tied to local financing, thereby linking the quality of education to the availability of local resources. The picture was one of a generalized state-level requirement that was administered locally, even reluctantly, amidst great fragmentation.

Disputes over curriculum began early, with the colonial leaders preferring one that prepared leaders (e.g., Latin, then the *lingua franca* of church, law, and government), and the towns a more practical one (the "three R's" argument arose early). The former insisted on grammar schools, but they became transformed locally into more practical programs. This is the first instance in American education of centralized mandates of quality being altered by the locals' preference for choice.

Virginia and other Southern states went about it quite differently, but theirs, too, was a fragmentation that fitted diverse local choices. Plantations scattered over large areas were inconsistent with central schools serving many students. In the absence of that organization for determining school quality, its amount and value was shaped by available income, creating a cascade of school forms determined by wealth. Thus, wealthy planters used tutors, yeomen would combine to hire a schoolmaster (usually the local minister), but most children learned only what an apprentice got from a master in some trade.

The Eighteenth Century. In the next century the diversity sketched here expanded significantly, mainly because of social changes. More people, more slavery, a nascent urban culture, more sectional and class differences, and new Enlightenment ideas--all altered the colonial scene tremendously. One alteration was in ideas about schooling, although some old practices remained; Virginians stuck to their cascade system. But New Englanders, in moving out of the main cities, found their town schools too far away, and so more were created in rural districts. Having a school meant that the town was now important, so vital was education in these settlers' minds.

Also, other bases for schooling emerged. Thus, more churches built schools (the Quakers were noteworthy, especially in Philadelphia), and many were open to all applicants, regardless of religion. Also, the growing port cities spawned many private schools catering to the new wealth of merchants and middle class. Often, these schools moved well beyond literacy and numeracy objectives. Further, in the cities and the hinterland, private academies arose to provide a practical, as well as classical, education. As a champion of these, Benjamin Franklin said, with typical conciseness, that they should offer "those things that are likely to be most useful and most ornamental." What was "useful," "ornamental," scientific, and English-based--the provision of these created many academies in this century. (Morison, 1956). Some became colleges, but most were to change into elementary or college-preparatory schools.

Little of this educational effort applied to slaves, however. On the plantation they were taught only what helped farming to thrive. Educating them was feared by slave-owners due to its potential for unrest; South Carolina in 1740 forbade such education. However, some churches, especially the Anglicans and Quakers, tried to teach

slaves, but only slivers of their total number were touched by these earnest efforts.

Summary. This brief sketch of the founding era shows a familiar picture of great diversity in origins of the settlers, adaptations of British practices to the colonial conditions, and a lack of any agreed sense of being a "nation." This diversity applied as well to the structure of schooling. Private and public, secular and sacred, wealthy and middle class, classical and practical, South and North--all these dimensions of difference found their expression in the hodge-podge of schools that emerged well before the Revolution. There was little yet to bound this service together to create standards of efficiency (much less quality) when the champions of choice prevailed in every colony.

The Common School Reforms

These conditions continued through the Revolution, Articles of Confederation, and the first fifty years of the Republic because the forces of localism, with their insistence on choosing one's own education, still prevailed. A major shift was to commence around 1840, however, with the "common school" reform that sprang first from Massachusetts in the ideas and proselytizing of Horace Mann (Cremin, 1951). When it finished, more centralization was to exist than the nation's schools had every known, but it was a far cry from that sought in the late 19th century.

Horace Mann and School Quality. Central to the common schools of Horace Mann were the manifest ideas for which he energetically campaigned throughout Massachusetts and later the nation (Cremin, 1957). These were the twin beliefs that schools should be both free and public. Understanding that many children would be educated at public cost was attractive to many parents and was well received everywhere, except in the South (Mississippi adopted them only in 1910).

As Mann and others surveyed the condition of schooling in Massachusetts during the 1830's (he was its Superintendent of Education for twelve years), his annual reports found it in miserable condition. There were bad teachers, undisciplined pupils, confusing variety of texts, and dilapidated school houses affecting their pupils' health. Church and philanthropy, as well as the general state laws, could not do enough. For example, an 1827 law requiring

annual reports from local towns on schooling provisions found five years later that only 86 of over 200 had done so (Messerli, 1956,112).

So Mann turned to "devising legal means by which the superior power of the state could supplant the apparent abdication of traditional responsibilities by smaller units of authority within the Commonwealth" (106). No Prussian hierarchy was in his mind, but rather he would use the state to encourage local systems to do their duty toward schooling. This shift to state authority occurred also in other reforms of the period--Sunday schools, temperance, abolitionism.

Mann saw the state not as an agency of compulsion but one capable of moving local people to do the job. There would indeed be state standards of what good schools meant (his annual reports condemned certain schools for specific failures). The expectation was that local churches and other groups could use his criticisms to correct matters, thereby helping them to do what they had not thought possible. His credo was that "The maintenance of free schools rests wholly upon the social principle. It is emphatically the case where men, individually powerless, are collectively strong" (cited in 112). On some matters, though he used direct state action, for example, in educating itinerant children of Irish railroad construction workers and in creating teacher training institutions, or "normal" schools.

His efforts set off a continuing debate about the lines of responsibility between the state and local units. Debates then--over textbooks, principals' authority, religious teaching, full autonomy--were echoed in succeeding generations. But his passion for the state arousing local energies to build a better schooling system led others in the American states to do the same. Despite the continuing criticisms by some locals of a loss of freedom under such government control and complaints that the state was meddling in local business, the reform settled in across the states, albeit unevenly.

The "public" element of this service was rooted in local control by town boards of selectmen in his state, and elsewhere in elected boards of education. While this much is manifest, note that also implicit in his effort was also a belief that the state could both improve the quality of education and distribute it more efficiently

and equitably among the children. But realizing these values did require more centralization than had existed before. It was a special kind of centralization, though, that rested less on coercion than on the skills of persuasion and leadership that would stimulate among local people a sense of the need to provide better schooling for all students (the exception for slaves continued, however).

Common School Requirements. The attraction of the common school concept spread far beyond Massachusetts and Horace Mann because it embodied central elements in a growing American nation (Lannie, 1971). For example, the concept urged the need for having informed citizens to exercise political power in a representative republic. This was a central Enlightenment theme, echoed in Thomas Jefferson's aphorism, "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be" (313). On this idea, the politicians, clergymen, and educators could agree.

Yet other purposes could be served by expanding education. Americanization, first in building the sense of nation (still fledgling) in white Anglo-Saxon citizens, and later in convincing immigrants of the proper patriotic attitudes, could be provided by a common education of both groups. Education could also provide citizens with the correct moral and religious (primarily Protestant) values necessary for a strong republican form of government. For this purpose, learning to read the Bible (usually the King James version) was the appropriate pedagogy, although not arguing or commenting on its meaning. Of course, Roman Catholics objected strenuously to this approach to instruction and so created their own schools affirming their values. Finally, expanding educational opportunities was important to the emerging class of workers, who needed schooling in their developing conflict with businessmen and industrialist (Peterson, 1985).

These themes brought together numerous streams of needs, and directing them were reformers, using innumerable speeches and writings designed to shape state laws. The requirements of these laws were as common as the schools they sought (Lannie, 1971, 316-319). Equality was to be served by schooling for all children of both genders (Mann thought if only one could be taught it should be females). Schooling was provided regardless of social, religious, or economic differences. Quality would be served by a curriculum that provided not simply literacy and numeracy but a civic understanding

of the community as being a nation for a people becoming increasingly diverse. To achieve this level of quality, the schools would be supported financially by local taxes. The state would set the basic standards of efficiency and quality and ensure their equitable application among the local schools.

The state requirements were not simply general. Reformers called for a curriculum of the three R's, handwriting, geography, moral and patriotic instruction--a balance of practical and moral training. Teacher requirements were enunciated by the reformers, and even written into some states' laws--to be irreproachable in morals, educated or experienced in teaching, familiar with their subjects. Their training became focused in normal schools, which by mid-century had a surprisingly large set of requirements. Even the nature of decent housing for education came under reformers' eyes, both its construction and its capacity (40 per room was desired).

We pass over the stormy and lengthy policy action required to institute these values that lasted into this century. But by the Civil War, what had been constructed already was the pride of not only Americans but Europeans as well. By that time American educational structures had gone far from the colonies' fragmented, limited, and religious schooling with its limited curriculum designed more for elites than average citizens. In the transition, we see a clear sign that an organizational change was required to elevate values of quality, efficiency, and equity, although at the expense of local control, or the choice value. Yet the nature of this centralization was still far from what it could have been, and was to be in the next era.

The Professionalization Reform. The next changes toward the end of the nineteenth century addressed a school population still largely rural, scattered, and multi-valued in curriculum, and of limited efficiency in pedagogy. Despite the success of common school reforms, their structure, typically a one-room school house, still had major limitations. There was weak popular support for taxes for schools, limited effectiveness in student learning, and a popular skepticism about the importance of much schooling. State involvement was minuscule compared to later generations, and Washington was involved only where the sale of federal land had provided for public schooling (viz., the Northwest Territory Ordinance and Morrill Land Act).

However, it was not rural education that stimulated the reformers but the arrival of enormous numbers of immigrants in the Eastern cities that created new problems. Aside from their desires for a common curriculum that would inspire all youth to a high patriotic spirit, would prepare them for the world of work, and would promote the values of civic life, reformers saw the immigrants as potential threats to an Anglo-Protestant society--unless socialized to the proper values. For the next reformers, then, quality in schooling meant several things. First, it must instill those values commonly through an organization that centralized their protection, but do so in efficient and democratic ways. Heretofore, school boards, embodying the Jacksonian impulse to elect everyone holding public trust, were subject to local pressures that worked against higher student achievement. Now, outside sources dedicated to providing better education needed to be provided, and one source was the spreading requirement of state law that school attendance be compulsory.

As with the police reforms noted earlier, efficiency was central to making this compulsion effective. It required several conditions be met: pressure outside the local school district to achieve it; a new kind of school personnel to provide it; and a new organization of resources to make it work. As Cremin (1961) said of one leading pedagogue in these reforms, "His emphasis is on order rather than freedom, on prescription rather than election, on the regularity, science, and industry that 'preserve and save our civil order'" (20). The spread of the new ideas came through the networking and proselytizing noted earlier for common-school reformers. Again, philanthropy, church, and volunteers spread the word and achieved success in persuasion (chap. 2). They became missionaries, sharing a common Protestantism, Anglo-Saxon ethnicity, and passion for civic virtue. They were an "aristocracy of character" that "relied heavily on the conscious-raising and institution-building activities of voluntary associations...in regional and national networks...akin to the religious movement that spread Protestant churches across a far-flung nation" (Tyack and Hansot, 1982, 5-6).

Reform Objectives. The central objective was to remove the amateur teaching and administration that was politically involved and substitute professional, non-partisan school practitioners. Favoritism, in the form of patronage in the school's jobs, like that for the police, was to be replaced by a merit system and training

programs in professional schools. Precinct school boards, epitomizing the decentralized nature of all schools, rural and urban, would be abolished for a city-wide elected board that appointed a general supervisor, or superintendent, who handled the personnel, instructional, and administrative tasks of the unified system.

With all this came the need for more laws to supervise, monitor, and finance these changes, and it fell to state government because decentralized districts resisted change. By 1900 a number of states had created state school boards (mostly appointive), state certification requirements, and some state funding of local schools. By 1966, the number of states doing so were almost complete (Fuller and Pearson, 1969, 71, 94, 393, 180).

These reforms brought a need for professional training schools that surpassed the normal school, and these, too, brought a centralizing influence with their professional norms of what programs and practices constituted quality, efficiency, and equity for the children (except, again, for black Americans). Reformers believed that there was "one best system" for making educational decisions about these values (Tyack, 1974), thereby producing a "cult of efficiency" (Callahan, 1962). Depolitizing schools was to be provided by "nonpartisan" board elections and by appointment of school personnel under merit systems. Actually, it was another form of politization, one "that rested not on representativeness or participation but on expertise" (Tyack and Hansot, 1982, 106-08). The reformers' stress on efficiency developed its own special politics that emphasized the need for centralization in achieving results (Schiesel, 1977). In short two systems of decision making were in contest here. One, decentralized, sought to fit government resources to the disparate needs of differing neighborhoods. The second, emerging from city-wide interests of business groups and professionals, sought city-wide programs stressing greater quality and more efficiency that required centralization to achieve (45).

Equity would be accomplished, it was believed, when these reforms were in place because the new, higher quality of education would serve more children by setting higher standards of performance. Special needs, would be endorsed as long as it was available to all who needed it, for example, vocational education in the 1910's from Washington (Swanson, 1969) or equalized financing in the 1920's from the states (Johns, 1969).

Summary

Enough of events in this era has been set out to indicate how centralization was thought necessary to improve the quality, efficiency, and equity of educational services. Reformers succeeded everywhere, although the account is longer than provided here, for the pace was uneven and protracted. Success came, however, at the expense of the formerly decentralized system. It was one that had served for over two centuries to respond to the differing natures of a scattered population with a passion for local control of anything public. What they thought they would lose with these reforms they did lose. But the reformers' success in getting the public to accept their myths of being apolitical, as well as experts, lasted for generations, down to our own time when we are intensely considering aspects of choice once again.

The Cycle of Values

Looking about him at all the many efforts at "neighborhood government" and "street front" services during the 1960's, public administration specialist Herbert Kaufman (1969) suggested that the basic values of a democratic nation are differently emphasized in different time periods. The result is a cycle, in which at one time one value is more stressed than others, until its disadvantages in turn bring reform emphasizing another value, which later creates other problems, thereby calling for another value, and so on.

Consequently, in viewing decentralization during the Great Society era, he predicted that:

It will not take long for the price of these changes to make itself felt. Decentralization will soon be followed by disparities in practice among the numerous small units, brought on by differences in human and financial resources, that will engender demands for central intervention to restore equality and balance and concerted action....It will give rise to competition among the units that will be disastrous for many of them, which will find it more difficult to attract talent and money than others that start from a more advantageous position. In some units, strong factions may well

succeed in reviving a new spoils system, thus lowering the quality of some vital services (11).

No matter how gloomy that prediction seemed over twenty years ago, all of those decentralization programs that Kaufman analyzed then have not achieved their goals, and some of the outcomes he predicted did come true (e.g., Shalala, 1972). The reasons lie in the argument advanced here, that different organizations are required to realize different basic values. Accordingly, as we move today to experimenting with choice values that involves site-based management, what will happen derives from the organization itself, and not all of these are positive results. This is, at least, a testable proposition, and certainly the dangers shown here from historical evidence should be provided against in such reform.

Table 1
Regulation of Specialists by New York Ordinances. Early 19th
Century

Inspectors of : flour, weights, and measures, liquor transportation, pipe stoves, leather, grain for distilling, firewood, boards, flax, taverns, hemp, pot and pearl ash, horse and cattle for export, sole leather, manure, fish, lumber, hackney carriages, pawn shops.

Overseers of : workingmen, butchers, carts and cartmen.

Weighers of: loaf bread, anthracite coal, weighmasters for hay.

Measurers of: grain, liquors and liquids, lime, ship timbers, charcoal.

Miscellaneous: master carpenters, surveyors and guagers of casks, haven masters, clerks of the markets, packers and viewers of casks, repackers of beef and pork, superintendent of stages and of junk shops.

Source: Abstracted from Bacon, 1939, 767.

REFERENCES

Bacon, Selden. 1939. "The Early Development of American Municipal Police." Ph.D. dissertation in Sociology, Yale University.

Boyd, William and Charles Kerchner, eds. 1988. The Politics of Excellence and Choice in Education. New York: Falmer, Yearbook of the Politics of Education Association.

Callahan, Raymond. 1962. Education and the Cult of Efficiency. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Callow, Jr., Alexander. 1966. The Tweed Ring. New York:

Chapman, Samuel and T. Eric St. Johnston. 1962. The Police Heritage in England and America. E. Lansing: Institute for Community Development and Services, Michigan State University.

Chubb, John and Terry Moe. 1990. Politics, Markets, and America's Schools. Washington, DC: Brookings.

Cremin, Lawrence. 1951. The American Common School. New York: Teachers College Press.

Cremin, Lawrence, ed. 1957. The Republic and the School. New York: Teachers College Press.

Easton, David. 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Elazar, Daniel. 1984. American Federalism, 3d ed. New York: Harper & Row.

Fosdick, Raymond. 1920. American Police Systems. New York: Century.

Fuller, Edgar and Jim Pearson, eds. 1969. Education in the States: Nationwide Development since 1900. Washington, DC: National Education Association.

Garms, Walter, James Guthrie, and Lawrence Pierce. 1987. School Finance, 2d ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Graper, Elmer. 1921. American Policy Administration. New York: Macmillan.

Griffith, Ernest. 1927. The Modern Development of City Government in the United Kingdom and the United States, vol. 1. London: Oxford University Press.

Griffith, Ernest. 1974. A History of American City Government: The Conspicuous Failure 1870-1900. New York: Praeger.

Griffith, Ernest and Charles Adrian. 1976. A History of American City Government: The Formation of Traditions 1775-1870. New York: Praeger.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1960. The Age of Reform. New York: Vintage.

Johns, R.L. 1969. "State Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education." In Education in the States: Nationwide Development since 1900, E. Fuller and J. Pearson, eds. Washington, DC: National Education Association.

Kaufman, Herbert. 1969. "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power." Public Administration Review 29: 3-15.

Lannie, Vincent. 1971. "Common School Movement." In The Encyclopedia of Education, Vol. 2. L. Deighton, ed. New York: Macmillan, Free Press.

Lineberry, Robert. 1977. Equality and Urban Policy. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Marshall, Catherine, Douglas Mitchell, and Frederick Wirt. 1989. Culture and Education Policy in the American States. New York: Falmer.

Messerli, Jonathan. 1956. "Localism and State Control in Horace Mann's Reform of the Common School." American Quarterly 17: 104-18.

Morison, Samuel. 1956. The Intellectual Life of Colonial New England. New York: New York University Press.

Munro, William. 1923. Municipal Government and Administration. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan.

Patton, Clifford. 1940. The Battle for Municipal Reform. Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs.

Peterson, Paul. 1981. City Limits. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Reed, Thomas. 1941. Municipal Management. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Schaffarzick, Jon and Gary Sykes, eds. 1979. Value Conflict and Curriculum Issues. Berkeley, CA: McCutchan.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semisovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Schiesl, Martin. 1977. The Politics of Efficiency. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Seeley, David. 1985. Education through Partnership. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute.

Shalala, Donna. 1972. Decentralization. New York: National Academy of Public Administration.

Shields, Currin. 1952. "The American Tradition of Empirical Collectivism." American Political Science Review 46: 104-20.

Sloan, Douglas. 1971. "History of Colonial Schools." In The Encyclopedia of Education. Vol. 2. L. Deighton, ed. New York: Macmillan, Free Press.

Smith, Bruce. 1949. Police Systems in the United States. 2d. ed. New York: Harper.

Swanson, Gordon. 1969. "The World of Work." In Education in the States: Nationwide Development since 1900. E. Fuller and J. Pearson, eds. Washington, DC: National Education Association.

Tolman, William. 1895. Municipal Reform Movements in the United States. New York: Revell.

Tyack, David. 1974. One Best System. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tyack, David and Elisabeth Hansot. 1982. Managers of Virtue. New York: Basic.

Wirt, Frederick. 1991. "Value-Organization Linkages, Educational Restructuring, and Historical Reforms." Paper presented to the annual convention of the American Education Research Association, Chicago.

Wirt, Frederick and Michael Kirst. 1989. Schools in Conflict. 2d ed. Berkeley: McCutchan.

Woodruff, Clinton, ed. 1919. A New Municipal Program. New York: Appleton.

Wright, Deil. 1982. Understanding Intergovernmental Relations. 2d ed. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Wright, Joseph. 1925. Selected Readings in Municipal Problems. New York: Ginn.